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A commentary on
Unconvincing support for role of mirror
neurons in “action understanding”: com-
mentary on Michael et al. (2014)
by Catmur, C. (2014). Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 8:553. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.
00553
In a recent commentary published in
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, Catmur
(2014) raises several important questions
for discussion about a study we pub-
lished earlier this year (Michael et al.,
2014). In the following, however, we point
out that her criticism is based upon two
inferences that we do not find convinc-
ing, and we maintain that the conserva-
tive interpretation offered in our original
article is more appropriate than Catmur’s
alternative interpretation.
In our study, we used offline contin-
uous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) to
investigate whether regions of premotor
cortex (PMC) play a causal role in action
understanding. Participants received cTBS
over the hand and lip areas of left PMC,
in separate sessions, before completing a
pantomime-recognition task in which half
of the trials contained pantomimed hand
actions, and half contained pantomimed
mouth actions. The results revealed a
double dissociation: Participants were less
accurate in recognizing pantomimed hand
actions after receiving cTBS over the
hand area than over the lip area and
less accurate in recognizing pantomimed
mouth actions after receiving cTBS over
the lip area than over the hand area. We
argued that this finding constrains the-
ories of action understanding by show-
ing that somatotopically organized regions
of PMC contribute causally to action
understanding.
However, as Catmur observes, a further
aim of the study was to shed light upon
the specific functional role of the targeted
premotor neural populations, i.e., whether
they contribute to action understanding
by encoding kinematic information about
observed actions, or by encoding the
proximal or distal goals (e.g., to grasp
a cup or to drink) of those actions.
We therefore devised three separate tasks
to probe different components of action
understanding. The simplest of the three
tasks required participants to identify still
frames from brief videos of pantomimed
actions. This task thus probed a percep-
tual component of action understanding,
i.e., the ability to process kinematic fea-
tures of observed actions. An intermedi-
ate task required them to select which
of three objects complemented a brief
video of a pantomimed action, thus prob-
ing their ability to identify the prox-
imal goal of an observed action. The
most complex task required them to select
which of three objects complemented a
brief video of a pantomimed action in
a context-sensitive manner, thus probing
their ability to identify the distal goal of
an observed action. The results showed no
significant difference among these three
tasks. Catmur concludes that the most
adequate interpretation of the data would
be one that identifies the functional con-
tribution of the targeted neural popu-
lations as whatever is common to the
three tasks—and this is the encoding of
kinematic information. As she puts it:
“Recall that all three tasks required
action perception: since performance on
all three tasks was impaired, these data
suggest that mirror neuron areas are
involved, not in higher-level processes
such as matching an action to its goal
object or selecting the relevant object
for that action in a given context, but
instead in a lower-level process of action
perception” (Catmur, 2014, p. 2).
Note, however, that this constitutes an
inference from the absence of evidence
to evidence of absence. But the absence
of a significant interaction does not
warrant the inference that the impact
of magnetic stimulation for all tasks is
the same; it simply means that we did
not find evidence that it is different.
This may have been due to various rea-
sons, one important candidate being
lack of statistical power. A further pos-
sibility is that any neurons contributing
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differently among the three levels of
complexity are not somatotopically
distributed, and are affected more or
less equally at the two stimulation sites.
In view of our ignorance on this mat-
ter, we believe that the more conservative
conclusion we originally offered (acknowl-
edging the possibility that the targeted
areas specialize in processing low-level
kinematic information) is the most
appropriate one:
“Given the absence of any three-way
interaction of TMS site, video type, and
complexity level (simple, inter-mediate,
complex), our results do not permit
any inferences about the hierarchical
level at which premotor regions con-
tribute to action understanding (i.e.,
whether these areas specifically encode
low-level kinematics, proximal goals, or
distal goals). One possibility is that
the areas we targeted encode low-level
kinematic information about observed
movements and that this kinematic
information is relevant for tasks of vary-
ing complexity” (Michael et al., 2014,
p. 970).
It is also worth noting that Catmur draws
a second inference as well: from the
claim that mirror neuron areas may be
involved in “action perception” to the fur-
ther claim that they are not involved in
“higher-level processes such as matching
an action to its goal object or select-
ing the relevant object for that action in
a given context.” This inference depends
upon the radically modularist premise
that it is not possible for some of
the processes underpinning action per-
ception sometimes to contribute to the
process of making judgments about the
(proximal and distal) goals of observed
actions. We see no reason to accept this
premise. As a result, while we agree
with Catmur’s assessment that the areas
in question possibly (even likely) spe-
cialize in a relatively low-level process
(encoding kinematic information about
observed actions), we also suggest that this
low-level process can contribute to the
process of making judgments about the
(proximal and distal) goals of observed
actions.
Clearly there is a risk of falling into
mere terminological quibbling about the
terms “action perception” and “action
understanding,” and Catmur is right to
observe that such quibbling has hampered
research in this area. It was in part in
order to avoid this that we invoked the
more precise tripartite distinction among
kinematics, proximal goals and distal goals
[borrowed from Hamilton and Grafton
(2007)]. Although our results did not ulti-
mately resolve the question as to the hier-
archical level at which the areas targeted
in our study contribute to action under-
standing, our attempt to operationalize
this more precise distinction may be a use-
ful starting point for further research.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Alessandro
D’Ausilio and Thor Grünbaum for
helpful discussions during the prepa-
ration of this brief reply. J. Michael
was supported by a grant from the
European Cooperation in Science and
Technology Short-Term Scientific Mission
BM0605-8202. M. Overgaard and K.
Sandberg were supported by a start-
ing grant from the European Research
Council.
REFERENCES
Catmur, C. (2014). Unconvincing support for role
of mirror neurons in “action understanding”:
commentary on Michael et al. (2014). Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 8:553. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00553
Hamilton, A., and Grafton, S. (2007). “The
motor hierarchy: from kinematics to goals
and intentions,” in Sensorimotor Foundations
of Higher Cognition: Attention and Performance
eds P. Haggard, Y. Rossetti, and M. Kawato
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press),
381–408.
Michael, J., Sandberg, K., Skewes, J., Wolf, T.,
Blicher, J., Overgaard, M., et al. (2014). TMS
(cTBS) demonstrates a causal role of premotor
homunculus in action understanding. Psychol.
Sci. 25, 963–972. doi: 10.1177/0956797613
520608
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 16 September 2014; accepted: 15 October
2014; published online: 31 October 2014.
Citation: Michael J, Sandberg K, Skewes J, Wolf
T, Blicher J, Overgaard M and Frith C (2014)
Unconvincing statistical and functional inferences: reply
to Catmur. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:887. doi: 10.3389/
fnhum.2014.00887
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Michael, Sandberg, Skewes, Wolf,
Blicher, Overgaard and Frith. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permit-
ted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted aca-
demic practice. No use, distribution or reproduc-
tion is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 887 | 2
